- Slavoj Zizek, In Defense of Lost Causes, 2008.
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The moment I inject discourse from my u. of d. into your u. of d., the yourness of yours is diluted. The more I inject, the more you dilute. Soon you will be presiding over an empty plenum, or, rather, since that is a contradiction in terms, over a former plenum, in terms of yourness. You are, essentially, in my power. I suggest an unlisted number.
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But far from announcing a kind of “pathological fissure,” the frontier separating the “two” substances, i.e., the thing that appears clear to an objective look and the “substance of enjoyment” that can be perceived clearly only by “looking awry,” is precisely what prevents us from sliding into psychosis. Such is the effect of the symbolic order on the visible. The emergence of language opens up a hole in reality, and this hole shifts the axis of our look; language redoubles “reality” into itself and the void of the Thing that can be filled out only by an anamorphic gaze from aside. (35)
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The destiny of the femme fatale in film noir, her final hysterical breakdown, exemplifies perfectly the Lacanian proposition that “Woman does not exist.” She is nothing but “the symptom of man.” Her power of fascination masks the void of her nonexistence, so when she is finally rejected, her whole ontological consistency is dissolved. But precisely as nonexisting, i.e., at the moment at which, through the hysterical breakdown, she assumes her nonexistence, she constitutes herself as a “subject.” What is waiting for her beyond hysterization is the death drive at its purest. (54)
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What we have here are thus two realities, two “substances.” On the level of the first metaphor, we have the commonsense reality as “substance with twenty shadows,” as a thing split into twenty reflections by our subjective view; in short, as a substantial “reality” distorted by our subjective perspective (inflated by our anxiety, etc.). If we look a thing straight on, from a matter-of-fact perspective, we see it “as it really is,” while the look puzzled by our desires and anxieties (“looking awry”) gives us a distorted, blurred image of the thing. On the level of the second metaphor (anamorphosis), however, the relation is exactly the opposite: if we look a thing straight on, i.e., from a matter-of-fact, disinterested, “objective” perspective, we see nothing but a formless spot. The object assumes clear and distinctive features only if we look at it “from aside,” i.e., with an “interested” look, with a look supported, permeated, and “distorted” by a desire. This is precisely the Lacanian objet petit a, the object-cause of desire, an object which is, in a way, posited by the desire itself. The paradox of desire is that it posits retroactively its own cause, i.e., an object that can be perceived only by the look distorted by desire, an object that does not exist for an “objective” look. In other words, the objet petit a is always, by definition, perceived in a distorted way, because, outside this distortion, “in itself,” it does not exist, i.e., because it is nothing but the embodiment, the materialization of this distortion, of this surplus of confusion and perturbation introduced by desire into so-called “objective reality.” Objet petit a is “objectively” nothing, it is nothing at all, nothing of the desire itself which, viewed from a certain perspective, assumes the shape of “something.” … Desire “takes off” when “something” (its object-cause) embodies, gives positive existence to its “nothing,” to its void. This “something” is the anamorphic object, a pure semblance that we can perceive clearly only by “looking awry.” It is precisely (and only) the logic of desire that belies the notorious wisdom that “nothing comes from nothing.” In the movement of desire, “something comes from nothing.” It is true that the object-cause of desire is a pure semblance, but this does not prevent it from triggering off a whole chain of consequences which regulate our “material,” “effective” life and deeds. (34)
As soon as the subject becomes aware that the other gazes at it (that the door is meant only for it), the fascination if over. (43)
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